Farm and Home Biosecurity
Consumer/General Public and Livestock/Row Crop Producer
Response to a Chemical Incident
Q. If there were chemical incident similar to the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack
on Tokyo subway system, what would be the Federal government's response?
A. The difference between the use of biological and chemical agents in an
attack, would be the existence of an incident scene. In a chemical attack where
the release of the agent was sufficient to cause serious harm, either a large
release of industrial chemical such as chlorine or phosgene, or a release of an
extremely toxic organophosphate such as VX, or sarin, the site of the release
would be obvious. The symptoms of exposure would be almost immediate and victims
would be present at the crime scene.
Assuming that there was no prior knowledge of the attack, as has happened in
terrorist attacks such as the African embassy, the World Trade Center or
Oklahoma Murray Federal Building, mitigation of a chemical incident and the
protection of human life would depend solely on the first responders. The speed
with which chemical agents act upon their victims mandates that treatment be
given immediately.
Atropine is the antidote for nerve agents. Most ambulances do not carry
atropine to treat even one case of severe organophosphate poisoning. In cases
where victims have been exposed to potentially lethal doses of nerve agent,
atropine would need to be administered within minutes, at the outside twenty to
thirty minutes, or death will occur. Victims exposed to lower sublethal doses
will survive without immediate treatment. In most jurisdictions, a Hazardous
Materials Unit (HAZMAT) would respond and would conduct a hazards risk
assessment prior to entering a contaminated environment. First responder
training across the country has focused on making responders aware of potential
dangers and keeping them from becoming victims by prematurely rushing in to a
suspicious scene. At best, twenty to thirty minutes would be necessary for
personnel to respond and don personal protective equipment before conducting
rescue operations. It may not be possible to rescue victims inside a
contaminated environment in sufficient time to minimize lethal exposure, and
most likely, only those victims who were ambulatory, and could self evacuate
from a scene, could be treated in sufficient time.
Most of this activity necessary to save life would have to take place within
the first 45 minutes to one hour of the incident, and would therefore be
completely dependent on the knowledge, training and equipment of the initial
responders. Most first responders are without proper equipment to detect agents
and/or lack protective equipment to properly work in a contaminated environment.
Medical response elements to such an incident also lack training, protective
equipment and appropriate pharmaceuticals.
The FBI field office would become aware of the incident within the first few
minutes. Agents who have received training and equipment through the current FBI
training program could be deployed to the scene to assess the incident. As the
Federal On Scene Manager, the FBI SAC consult with the state and local agencies
and would request follow on assets immediately to assist in the response. These
would include assets from Health and Human Services (HHS), such as the
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST), or the National Guard, Rapid
Assessment, Identification and Detection (RAID) team, other Department of
Defense Assets, such as the Army Technical Escort Unit (Tech Escort) or the
Marine Chemical/Biological Incident Response Group (CBIRF). Even if these assets
were deployed immediately however, they would not arrive in sufficient time to
help with those victims who had received lethal doses. The MMST and the RAID
team could assist with medical treatment to alleviate discomfort to victims of
sublethal exposure. HHS would be tasked with identifying appropriate stocks of
pharmaceuticals for ongoing treatment of victims.
Media coordination is of major importance. Tokyo experienced widespread fear
and panic in the moments following the Aum Shinrikyo attack. Estimates are that
approximately 500 individuals were actually affected by organophosphate
poisoning, however ten times that number approximately 5,000 people presented
themselves at hospitals for treatment. Most of those affected were ambulatory
and took themselves to the hospital as well. Triage and crowd control at the
hospitals would tax both medical and law enforcement personnel in the initial,
stages of the event.
The FBI's Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRU) would be deployed to the
scene immediately. Arrival time could range from one three hours for an attack
in the Washington, D.C. area up to eight to ten hours for a west coast
deployment. FBI would assume control of the crime scene and upon arrival HMRU
would begin assisting with detection and sampling of the chemical agent at the
scene. HMRU and the local FBI Evidence Response Team (ERT) would conduct a crime
scene investigation. Detection to assist in medical treatment of victims would
most likely have been accomplished by this time by either on scene HAZMAT teams
or, a medical review of the victim's symptomatology.
Appropriate investigation would commence to include interviews of victims
would begin when medical conditions permitted. Consequence management at this
point would consist mostly of continuing medical management victims. The extent
of decontamination of the scene would depend on many factors. DOD resources
could be utilized solely or to support local HAZMAT in the decontamination of
the scene when the crime scene investigation was completed. In the Tokyo
incident, the subways were running and open to the public again in several
hours. A vapor hazard may have dissipated completely by the time federal assets
arrive and require virtually no decontamination.
Effective response to a terrorist or criminal release of a chemical agent
will be dependant on the actions and capabilities of the initial responders in
the first few minutes of the incident. The Federal response will remain
predominantly a consequence management and post incident investigative role. The
On Scene Manager will coordinate the federal assistance and response to the
state and local agencies and will produce media and public notifications in
concert with the federal, state and local partners.
Prepared by: Basil C. Doyle, FBI WMDOU
Date/Time: Feb 1, 1999 (1:25PM)
Telephone: 202-324-0217
Back to Consumer/General Public
and Livestock/Row Crop Producer |
