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Farm and Home Biosecurity
Consumer/General Public and Livestock/Row Crop Producer
Coordinated Response To A Threatened Release Of A Biological
Agent
Q. How would the federal government respond to the following threatened
release of a biological agent? The chief of police of a mid-sized city receives
an anonymous telephone call that, unless a ransom is paid, the caller will
release a quantity of a deadly biological agent in a department store. To prove
his bona fides, the caller claims to have placed a sample of the substance in a
trash can at a location where it can readily be located.
A. Upon notification by local officials of the threat, the FBI SAC would
assume overall leadership responsibility for the federal response to the
incident and engage appropriate local authorities who would manage on-scene
public safety issues. This dual leadership is necessary because of the primacy
state and local officials possess in dealing with issues concerning public
safety. As the complexity of the situation evolves, other federal agencies may
serve lead roles for decisions vested in those organizations. Experience to date
has demonstrated a heavy reliance on the SAC by local authorities to access key
federal agency advisors and to counsel the cities throughout the crisis.
The SAC's responsibilities, as on-scene manager for the U.S. Government,
would include: (1) prevention of the terrorist act; (2) identification and
apprehension of the perpetrator and developing a criminal case against him; and
(3) ensuring that planning is being undertaken to address its potential
consequences.
Upon notification, FBIHQ would initiate a threat assessment process relying
on its expertise and upon the expertise of several key federal agencies as well
as on the information received from state and local agencies. This process
includes assessment of the threat from three perspectives.
•
technical feasibility--that is, the capacity to obtain or produce the
biological substance at issue, an assessment that would involve the expertise
of the FBI, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and, perhaps, DOD
for specific scientific advise.
•
operational practicality--that is, the feasibility of carrying out the
threatened mode of employment. Here, again, DHHS, FBI and DOD would be
intimately involved.
•
behavioral resolve--this factor addresses a psychological assessment of
the likelihood that the subject will carry out the threat and may involve a
review by behavioral scientists of the subject's message and any verbal
statement he may have made. The FBI's Behavioral Science Unit would likely
play the lead in making this determination.
Using these three criteria, members of the interagency team would collaborate
by conference call and prepare an aggregate assessment of the credibility of the
threat. Assuming the threat assessment process concludes that the threat is a
credible, the information would immediately be provided to the SAC (state and
local officials would normally be included in key conference calls to insure
timely advice.) The primary concern, however, is the safety of the public. The
SAC would take the following steps:
•
With the assistance of the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU),
assess the capabilities of local and state authorities to identify, package,
transport and analyze the sample substance. In the absence of such capability,
the SAC would request assistance from FBIHQ which, in turn, would dispatch the
HMRU and, depending upon need, request assistance from DOD via the Executive
Secretariat to the Secretary of Defense for transportation, render safe, and
analysis. Regardless of the initial testing facility, a federal laboratory
will do confirmatory analysis.
•
As appropriate request, the deployment of FBI technical and tactical
assets.
•
Request, if warranted, the deployment of a Domestic Emergency Support
Team or "DEST."
•
Upon arrival, if deployed, the DEST would provide advice to the SAC and
make recommendations regarding the deployment of additional federal assets.
DEST would address the crisis and initiate concurrent consequence management
planning.
•
The SAC would initially manage his responsibilities in a traditional
crisis management command post structure that would serve as a core for an
expansion into a Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JOC would incorporate all
federal agencies involved in dealing with the crisis including local
representatives of the DHHS, FEMA, and a liaison from DOD. Additionally,
involved state and local law enforcement and emergency service agencies would
participate in the JOC as full partners with their federal counterparts.
•
Establish a Joint Information Center or "JIC," also comprised
of federal, state, and local authorities for the purpose of managing the
dissemination of information to the media, members of the public, and
businesses potentially affected by the threat.
•
Throughout this process, the SAC would continue to work in a
coordinated effort with state and local law enforcement authorities to
identify the perpetrator of the threat, identify possible targets, and locate
the purported biological device.
Contemporaneously with these developments in the field, FBI headquarters
would activate its Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), which
would be staffed on a 24-hour basis throughout the crisis by agents with
terrorism experience and technical expertise. Additionally, representatives from
other involved federal agencies--DOD, DHHS and FEMA--would be invited to staff
the SlOC for the purposes of acting as liaisons to their agencies and acting on
requirements for additional resources.
Similarly, DOJ HQ would activate an Attorney Critical Incident Response Team
(ACIRG), comprised of prosecutors with terrorism experience, which would
coordinate with the local USAO and Bureau agents at the SlOC. If appropriate,
and in coordination with the local USAO, prosecutors with specialized training
and experience in crisis response would be deployed to assist.
Recent enhancement of FBI capabilities has reduced the reliance on military
support. If military technical assistance were required, the FBI would request
assistance from DOD through established and practiced procedures.
Under existing law and implementing DOD directives, a request for military
tactical assistance will be preceded by a mutual determination by the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Defense that civilian expertise is inadequate to
deal with the crisis and that military assistance is required in the interests
of national security. The Attorney General would request such assistance and
prepare the necessary documents for the President to sign.
In considering a request for tactical assistance the FBI on-scene commander
will consider recommendations of FBI specialists, principally from the Critical
Incident Response Group (CIRG), the Hazardous Materials Response Unit and the
Bomb Data Center, in consultation with DOD specialists. The FBI will consider a
number of situational factors, including the following:
•
The probability of achieving surprise and positive breaching of entry
points for tactical assets.
•
The ability of tactical assets to contain and bring superior force to
bear on all threats in a manner which minimizes loss of life.
•
The ability to bring appropriate technical/EOD assets to bear on a
device prior to it functioning.
•
Protection protection.
Prepared by:
Basil C. Doyle
FBI/WMDOU
January 27, 1999
Q. Describe a scenario which realistically depicts the procedures that take
place during the FBI's response to a WMD threat. Include technical and response
capabilities within the FBI for response to chemical, biological or radiological
threats.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. (CDT), State employee discovered a 5x7 envelope
in a stairwell on the second floor of the state office building. Inside the
first envelope was a second smaller envelope containing approximately two
tablespoons of a crystalline white powder and a note which stated that the
substance was anthrax. The employee who originally found the envelope took it to
the personnel office on the fourth floor and showed it to other employees.
Several people came into direct contact with the envelope.
State investigators were advised and surveyed the area where the envelope was
found. They discovered that a similar white powder had been distributed in three
of the building's elevators. The local FBI Field Office was contacted and agents
proceeded to the scene. Simultaneously, the Senior Supervisory Resident Agent (SSRA)
contacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU) at FBIHQ.
WMDOU initiated a threat assessment conference call which included the SSRA
and local officials along with Federal agencies to include EPA, PHS, CDC, DOD,
FEMA, and FBI Laboratory Division (LD) elements. FBI Agents and local
representatives presented the facts to the conference call participants. This
included a description of the substance and a detailed accounting of facts of
the case. It was determined that approximately 2,000 people worked in the
building daily. Of that number, approximately 120 people had potentially come
into contact with the substance in the elevators or the stairways. Contact
information was obtained from those 120 individuals and they were released. Due
to the number of people potentially exposed, a decision was made to deploy the
Laboratory Division's, Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU) to the scene.
Concurrently, guidance was provided to local HAZMAT officers who took samples
of the substance and packaged them for transport. The U.S. Marshals Service
assisted the FBI by immediately diverting a jet to the scene. The U.S. Marshals'
jet transported the samples, accompanied by a local HAZMAT officer and an FBI
agent, to the Washington, D.C. area for analysis at the Naval Medical Research
Institute (NAMRI).
HMRU deployed to the scene, did initial field screening for anthrax,
collected the evidence and returned to Washington, D.C. (WDC) to complete
laboratory testing. The total elapsed time from the notification of HMRU to
their return the WDC area, and transport to NAMRI was fourteen hours. Both the
on scene analysis by HMRU and the laboratory analysis by NAMRI failed to
disclose any biological agents present at the scene or in the collected
evidence. After initial screening, the evidence was transferred to the FBI
Laboratory for further forensic examination.
The following day, a local television station received an eleven page letter
containing a copy of the initial threat letter, which appears to have been
written by the same author. The wording of the letter indicates that it was
intended to arrive contemporaneously with the threat at the state office
building. The letter was reviewed by the National Center for the Analysis of
Violent Crime, and the threat was deemed not credible from a behavioral
assessments.
The rapid and effective response to this situation was the result of
tremendous interagency cooperation between state, local and federal agencies to
include U.S. Marshals service who, though not normally a WMD response agency,
nevertheless responded immediately to the FBI's request. The type of cooperation
experienced in this incident is typical of the response seen in cases across the
country. In cases in Louisville, Miami, Ocala, Dallas, Phoenix and numerous
others, the FBI, as the lead federal agency, has fulfilled its duty through
rapid delivery of technical and medical expertise to the local incident
commanders at the scene, and by providing response elements in a timely manner
when needed.
Within the last year, HMRU has been deployed thirty times in support of
chemical, biological and radiological cases across the country. Training of FBI
field agents began in December 1998, and classes will continue throughout the
year until every field office has personnel trained to respond to, and assist in
the initial detection and assessment of, WMD incidents. Personal Protective
Equipment, and chemical, biological and radiological detection equipment has
already been purchased and is being distributed to field offices upon completion
of the training. Field offices with significant special events, such as Miami,
were afforded priority for the training and equipment dispersal.
Centers for Disease Control have been actively engaged in many of these
incidents and have recently published an advisory that directs state
epidemiologist and public health officials to immediately notify the FBI to
initiate the threat assessment process. CDC further identifies the FBI as the
mechanism for identifying technical and response assets.
FBI field offices continue to prepare and train with state, local and federal
officials to ensure coordinated response to WMD threats and incidents. It has
become apparent that rapidly providing technical expertise to the incident
commanders has proven to be the most important element in mitigating the public
fear and avoiding the overtaxing of response resources.
Written by: Roland J. Mignone
Date/Time: January 27, 1999
Telephone: (202) 324-0222
Reviewed by: Robert Blecksmith, DT/CPS
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